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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




DEAN VARGO, an adult incompetent by his parent
and natural guardian PATRICIA A. VARGO,
                                                                                  Appellant
v.
PLUM BOROUGH; PLUM BOROUGH POLICE DEPARTMENT; ROBERT PAYNE,
individually and in his capacity as Chief of Police; ERIC SCHLARP, individually and in
his capacity as a police officer of Plum Borough; DARRYL D. GRANATA, JR.,
individually and in his capacity as a police officer of Plum Borough; DONALD LEE
TEMPLE, JR., individually and in his capacity as a police officer of Plum Borough; 
LISA A. LINN, individually and in her capacity as dispatcher for the Plum Borough
Police Department and for Plum Borough
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-06-cv-01574)
District Judge:  The Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 12, 2010
Before: SLOVITER and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
and RESTANI,  Judge.*
(Filed : April 19, 2010)
2___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Dean Vargo was arrested by Plum Borough police for failure to appear for a trial. 
He was taken to the Plum Borough Police Station and placed in a holding cell.  No other
prisoners were in the cell with him.  After he was locked into the cell, the police officers
left the station to respond to another call, leaving the police dispatcher alone in the
station.  The dispatcher, able to monitor Vargo in the holding cell on a closed-circuit
television, noticed Vargo attempting to commit suicide by hanging himself with his shirt,
which he had fastened to the cell bars.  Station policy, however, prohibited the dispatcher
from entering cells occupied by prisoners, even in cases of emergency.  Thus, the
dispatcher could not attempt a rescue, but did contact police officers.  Vargo did not die,
but suffered severe brain damage as a result of his suicide attempt.
Vargo, by his parent and guardian, sued, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and Pennsylvania tort law.  The District Court first dismissed the state law claims, finding
immunity for the Borough and its police officers.  Following discovery, the District Court
granted summary judgment to the Borough and its officers on Vargo’s remaining § 1983
claim.   We will affirm essentially for the reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation as adopted by the District Court.  We will, however, briefly
outline our ratio decidendi on some of the issues raised by Vargo on appeal. 
3I.
We begin with the District Court’s dismissal of Vargo’s state law claims.  Here,
the District Court properly determined that the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act gave Plum Borough and its police officers immunity from suit.  The Act
provides that “no local agency shall be liable for any act of the local agency or employees
thereof or any other person.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541.  Vargo relies on a dissenting
opinion in Pennsylvania State Police v. Klimek, 839 A.2d 1173 (Pa. Cmwlth. Ct. 2003).
This, however, does not rescue his claim.  The Magistrate Judge correctly relied on the
majority opinion in Klimek and did not err by holding the Borough immune from suit
under Pennsylvania law.
Vargo additionally argues that the allegations contained in Count III of his
complaint allege willful misconduct, not negligence.  He argues that because the Borough
police officers knew that he was in an agitated state and under the influence of narcotics
when arrested, he was vulnerable to suicide.  This, however, does not amount to willful
misconduct.  As we have held, willful misconduct under Pennsylvania law is a
“demanding level of fault,” and we have found it synonymous with an allegation of an
“intentional tort.”  See Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 315 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Renk v.
City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 294 (Pa. 1994); Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443
F.3d 276, 287 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Vargo does not allege any intent by the Borough or
Borough police officers to cause harm nor does his complaint allege that the Appellees
4were “substantially certain” that Vargo would attempt suicide.  Id.  Without these specific
allegations, there can be no finding of willful misconduct and it was not error for the
District Court to dismiss Vargo’s complaint.
II.
Because Vargo was a pretrial detainee, we analyze his § 1983 claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process protection against arbitrary abuse of
government power, his Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment
having not yet attached.  See Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp. (Colburn I), 838 F.2d 663,
668 (3d Cir. 1988).
Municipalities, which are considered “persons” under § 1983, may be liable for
constitutional torts if two prerequisites are met: (1) the plaintiff's harm was caused by a
constitutional deprivation; and (2) the municipal entity is responsible for that violation.
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). A government entity may
not be held vicariously liable for the constitutional violations of its agents under a theory
of respondeat superior. Id. at 122. Instead, municipal entities are only liable under § 1983
“when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or
by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the
injury that the government as an entity is responsible for under § 1983.” Monell v. Dept.
of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
5In Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp. (Colburn II), we explained that a plaintiff in a
pretrial detainee prison suicide case must establish each of the following three elements to
establish a violation of due process: (1) the detainee had a “particular vulnerability to
suicide;” (2) the custodial officer or officers should have known of that vulnerability; and
(3) those officers “acted with reckless indifference” to the detainee’s particular
vulnerability. 946 F.2d 1017, 1024 (3d Cir. 1991). Under the first prong, the plaintiff
must show that there was a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that
self-inflicted harm will occur.” Id. The second prong reflects the requirement that “[t]he
strong likelihood of suicide must be so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize
the necessity for preventative action; the risk of self-inflicted injury must not only be
great, but also sufficiently apparent that a lay custodian’s failure to appreciate it evidences
an absence of any concern for the welfare of his or her charges.” Id. at 1025. Finally, the
third prong recognizes that there must be a link between the prison official’s knowledge
and his disregard of the prisoner’s particular risk. Although we have not developed the
exact contours of the third prong, we have suggested that it is similar to the “deliberate
indifference” standard applied to a claim brought under the Eighth Amendment, which
requires the plaintiff to prove that the prison official “know[s] of and disregard[s] an
excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d
314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2001)).
6Based upon the evidence of record, the District Court determined that Vargo could
not prove that he had a particular vulnerability to suicide. We agree with that conclusion.
No witness observed or claimed that Vargo was acting abnormally or that he gave any
indication that he was going to inflict harm upon himself.  Additionally, testimony
indicated that if Vargo had exhibited any behavior or made any articulable threat to his
personal safety, he would not have been left alone in the cell.  Finally, the record clearly
establishes that Vargo had no history of suicide attempts and that his family was unaware
if Vargo was afflicted with  any mental health problems.  
We find persuasive the District Court’s conclusion that Vargo did not present any
evidence that an additional screening method would have aided him, especially where
those individuals who knew Vargo have testified that he gave no indication that he
wished to harm himself.  For example, the record relates that people who knew Vargo
were “shocked” by his suicide attempt.  See Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1026 (commenting
that similar evidence seeking to establish that heavy intoxication is a “serious red flag” of
a predisposition to commit a jailhouse suicide was insufficient to establish a particular
vulnerability to suicide). We have instructed that the Colburn test is detainee-specific, and
here, Vargo simply failed to submit sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact that there
was a “strong likelihood” that he would commit suicide.  
III.
7As to the remaining issues presented on appeal, we will affirm essentially for the
reasons set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, as adopted by
the District Court. We conclude that the District Court did not err by adopting the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and by granting summary judgment in
favor of the Borough and its police officers.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
